Supporting the State Victim of Aggression in a Divided World: Ukraine and Neutrality

In the global geopolitical context, the war in Ukraine has brought to the fore complex legal and moral questions regarding international law and the legitimacy of actions taken by countries not directly involved in the conflict. While the bombings, battles and human tragedies dominate the headlines, another significant combat is being fought in the background: the legal and diplomatic battle over the relevance of the law of neutrality in the 21st century.

Neutrality is an institution of “classical” international law, still in principle binding on states, which requires that third states to an international armed conflict refrain from intervention, avoiding any action that might favor one of the belligerent states. Neutrality is hard to square with the UN Charter, which instead allows backing a country that is the victim of an aggression. In the absence of any harmonization between these two regimes of international law, it is unclear what rules bind states when one of the belligerents is clearly a victim of aggression, as is the case of Ukraine.

Against this backdrop Niccolò Zugliani, Post-Doc Researcher at Bocconi University, in his article published in the European Journal of International Law, explores the actions of states during the conflict in Ukraine, focusing on the supply of arms to Ukraine, in order to clarify whether neutrality law is still applicable when an armed conflict is a consequence of an act of aggression. 

Among the many prohibitions placed by neutrality law on non-belligerent states is the ban on supplying arms to countries at war. Despite the prohibition, many states are supporting Ukraine in various ways, including by supplying weapons and military equipment. The same states have in no way attempted to justify such conduct, ostensibly incompatible with neutrality, by invoking the existence of exceptions to its rules. At the same time, Russia has never formally accused these states of violating neutrality obligations. This raises an important question: in cases like the invasion of Ukraine, is the law of neutrality still applicable?

Zugliani suggests that “neutrality, as it has been considered for centuries, may no longer be applicable in modern conflicts, if acts of aggression are clearly identifiable and condemnable.” Indeed, the Ukrainian experience may indicate a transition to a legal concept of “non-belligerence,” understood as an intermediate status between belligerence and neutrality. Such a status, long criticized by scholars and still generally considered groundless, in the Ukrainian case is in practice supported, according to Zugliani, in the behavior of countries, which is a necessary element for the creation of new rules of customary international law. This analysis provides a new perspective on the international law regarding armed conflict, which would allow third states to provide support to a victim of aggression without being considered directly involved in the conflict.

At a time when the international community is increasingly polarized and conflicts tend to get ever more complex, Zugliani's work invites us to reflect on the role of neutrality and the role states can and should play when dealing with international crises. The debate is open, and the answers are not simple, but one thing is certain: decisions made today will set precedents that could influence the management of future conflicts for decades to come. Zugliani's argument challenges us to rethink our beliefs about how states should behave in a world where the lines between aggressor and victim are sometimes blurred, and offers insight for policymakers and diplomats called upon to make decisions in an increasingly complex and interconnected global context. The road to a new understanding of neutrality law is still long and winding, but, as the Ukrainian experience shows, it can no longer be ignored.