How Open Borders Fueled the Far Right in Switzerland
In the early 2000s, Switzerland opened its borders to workers from neighboring EU countries, expecting economic benefits and stronger ties with Europe. Instead, this move fueled a sharp rise in support for far-right, anti-immigrant parties—despite no measurable economic, cultural, or security threats. A recent study by Ala Alrababah (Department of Social and Political Sciences, Bocconi) with Andreas Beerli, Dominik Hangartner, and Dalston Ward (all of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology ETH, Zurich), published in the American Political Science Review, finds that this shift was not a reaction to actual threats caused by immigration, but rather the result of political elites crafting an anti-immigrant narrative.
Switzerland’s decision to open its labor market followed an agreement with the European Union, allowing citizens from neighboring France, Germany, and Italy to live and work in the country (and the other way around, of course). This policy change led to a surge in cross-border workers, especially in municipalities near the borders. The increase was significant—foreign workers in Swiss border towns rose by 14% on average. However, unlike other cases where immigration sparks cultural anxieties due to religious or ethnic differences, the new arrivals in Switzerland closely resembled the local population.
Economic concerns, another common driver of anti-immigrant sentiment, also failed to materialize. The study finds no evidence that the influx of foreign workers negatively affected Swiss wages or employment rates. On the contrary, Switzerland’s economy remained strong and Swiss firms, particularly in knowledge-intensive industries, benefited from the expanded labor market. Surveys conducted over two decades show that Swiss citizens in the border regions did not perceive greater economic threats, nor did they express heightened concerns about unemployment or rising costs of living.
Despite this, support for anti-immigrant parties surged. In border municipalities, far-right parties saw their vote share rise by six percentage points—a striking 32% increase compared to pre-liberalization levels. This increase was not mirrored in areas further from the border.
With no real economic or cultural crisis to exploit, why did voters turn to anti-immigrant parties? Right-wing populist parties introduced a new term to frame immigration as a problem: “density stress.” Originally a biological concept describing how overpopulation leads to collapse in animal populations, it was repurposed to evoke fears of overcrowding in Swiss cities. Political campaigns linked immigration to packed public transport, congested roads, urban sprawl, and even longer queues at shopping malls. By using the language of logistics rather than overt xenophobia, these parties made anti-immigrant rhetoric more palatable.
This messaging was particularly effective in border towns, where immigration levels had risen most visibly. Yet the study found little evidence that the supposed overcrowding problem actually worsened after the border opening. Traffic congestion, one of the most tangible markers of “density stress,” did not increase disproportionately in affected municipalities. Instead, the anti-immigrant parties amplified the narrative through speeches, media campaigns, and legislative proposals focused on the border towns.
The case of Switzerland highlights a broader lesson about immigration politics: public opposition to immigration is not always rooted in material or cultural concerns. Instead, political elites play a key role in shaping anti-immigrant narratives and public perceptions. This is not unique to Switzerland. In the UK, Brexit campaigners framed immigration as a crisis of infrastructure, claiming Britain had reached a “breaking point.” In the United States, Donald Trump used similar rhetoric, declaring that “our country is full” to justify his hardline immigration policies.
The Swiss experience serves as a cautionary tale for other nations grappling with immigration debates. It shows how political parties can exploit even mild demographic shifts associated with immigration from the same cultural, linguistic, and religious context to fuel anti-immigrant sentiment. While many assume that economic hardship or cultural friction lead to right-wing populism, this study suggests that political narratives can be just as influential.
