Counter-Terrorism in the US Electoral Discourse

The race toward the presidential election, with Kamala Harris and Donald Trump competing against each other, is refueling the debate on national security in the United States. 

When addressing counter-terrorism policies in the United States, three main areas deserve consideration. The first is international terrorism, which has never ceased being a threat, although it is not currently as much in the spotlight as it has been in the past. The second area is domestic terrorism, whose resurgence has characterized recent years, and the third concerns measures to be taken during the current electoral campaign to prevent potential violent attacks, which can indeed be seen as a sub-category of the struggle against terrorism. 

Starting from international terrorism, the United States has a very long history. Having been the target of the 9/11 tragedy, this country inaugurated an “age” of often incredibly harsh counter-terrorist policies, such as extraordinary renditions and targeted killings. 

The Biden administration has followed a similar path as its predecessors, albeit with a slightly more rights-oriented approach. For instance, Biden introduced clearer legal standards for the use of targeted killings, while also working toward transferring prisoners from Guantánamo. 

However, international terrorism has not been the primary focus of the Biden administration, which has been more preoccupied with addressing the growing domestic terrorism threat, as we will explore in the remainder of this piece.

However, the persisting – yet less visible, if compared to the past – menace of international terrorism is being used as a rhetorical device by the Republicans. The latter claimed in several electoral ads that the current Democratic administration is exposing the United States to a return of jihadist attacks, due to poor national security policies in this respect. 

The second area into which we need to delve is the fight against domestic terrorism. One of the very first issues that the Biden administration had to tackle was the attacks on Capitol Hill, which took place on 6 January 2021 and were classified as full-fledged acts of terrorism, to the extent that they brought on an impeachment (of President Donald Trump, then dismissed) and a criminal conviction of several rioters. 

During the first two years of Biden’s presidency, the issue of domestic terrorism was taken seriously, evidenced by the fact that he became the first US president to release a National Strategy to Counter Domestic Terrorism in 2021.

To implement this strategy, several bills were introduced in Congress between 2021 and 2022. One notable example is the *Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act*, which aimed to expand the powers of various federal agencies in order to curb the rise of domestic extremism. These agencies would be granted new, more intrusive surveillance powers to better address the growing threat.

However, looking at the progress of these bills, we can see that – between 2023 and 2024 – they were either dropped or, like the draft Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act, they have been stuck in Congress for a long time, filibustered by members of the Republican party. Hence, the initial activism of the Biden administration in this regard did not find practical implementation in legal rules. 

During the current electoral campaign, Republican candidates have not missed the opportunity to harshly criticize this issue, accusing the Democrats of merely pretending to be proactive. This criticism is somewhat paradoxical, given that many of Trump’s supporters were labeled as "terrorists" during the Capitol Hill attacks.

The last viewpoint regards tools to avoid political violence during the electoral campaign itself, something that is indeed very linked to the domestic terrorism dimension. 

We have all heard of the assassination attempt carried out against Donald Trump at a July 2024 campaign rally. This event, echoing past scenes of violence against US Presidents, triggered the need to put in place specific strategies to ensure the smooth pursuance of the electoral campaign. 

Based on data published by RAND, operative efforts are being made at the departmental level to put in place preventive plans, e.g. by designating state-level crisis response teams and conducting field training exercises to prevent and, if necessary, respond to political violence during rallies. 

This improvement of counter-violence forces can easily ameliorate the response to domestic terrorism in general, and work as a kind of “lesson learned” from the events that took place in January 2021 and July 2024. 

Some efforts are being made toward improving counter-terrorism strategies, more from the operative and policy framework than from a legal viewpoint. Additionally, references to terrorism, especially in its international form, are used more as rhetorical devices and ways to discredit the political adversary, than as the object of concrete plans and electoral agendas. Improving the legal framework will then be a challenge that the new administration should take up. 

The US is not doing so much in terms of boosting reliance on technology as a tool to counter (all types of) terrorism. For example, if one reads the recent executive order on artificial intelligence signed by President Biden, no reference is made to the use of these tools with a view to guaranteeing security. This is another desirable point to address for the forthcoming administration.