A World That Travels at Different Speeds

In 2023, two momentous events took place. The first concerns India, which has become the most populous country in the world with one billion and 429 million inhabitants, surpassing China by a few million and sailing fast towards the goal of one and a half billion. The second concerns China, which has reached the peak of its growth, starting to decline. Two billionaire giants numerically similar, but with a profoundly different structure and demographic future. China, with a very low average fertility rate of around one child per woman, is heading not only towards an inexorable decline in population, but also towards rapid aging. India, on the other hand, has only recently reached a replacement fertility level, i.e. just over two, and will see its population continue to grow inertially by more than 200 million between now and 2050, when it will reach the peak of its workforce: 800 million people of working age. This is exactly as many as China has today, as it declines after the 2011 peak.

The divergent demographic destinies of India and China are just one example of the world's unequal and turbulent demographics. This context sees the co-existence of countries that have completed their demographic transition (the decline in mortality followed by the decline in fertility) for more than half a century with countries where the transition has only just begun. Demographically "mature" populations are numerically stagnant, or in decline, and progressively aging; those furthest back in the transition are still growing fast and are very young. Convergence is still a long way off, both in mortality, with 20 more years of average survival in the former than in the latter, but above all in fertility.

And it is precisely on fertility levels that the numerical and structural change in the population depends most. South Korea, as well as Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, have reached a record of not even one child on average per woman, They will follow the fate of demographically "mature" places such as Japan, where fertility has been very low for decades, the population is declining at a rate of 0.7% per year – which means a loss of over 22 million inhabitants equal to 18% of the total population by 2050 – and the aging of the population is fast and inevitable (already almost 30% of the population is over 65 years old).

At the other end of the spectrum, Niger has a record average number of children, close to seven per woman, half of its population under the age of 15 (and only 3% over the age of 65), is growing at a rate of 3% per year, and will see its population double by 2050. A destiny shared with other countries in the area, such as Mali, Mauritania, but also the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia.

The different pace of population growth in different areas of the world is changing the relative weight of populations. In 1950 the world had only 2.5 billion inhabitants and among the ten most populous countries in the world, led by China, which then had just over half a billion inhabitants, there were three European countries (Russia, the United Kingdom and even Italy) and no African countries. Today, when we have exceeded a total of eight billion, there are no longer European countries among the most numerous, but there is an African country, Nigeria with 218 million inhabitants. In 2050, in the face of a probable increase in world population of 1.7 billion inhabitants, the ranking of the ten most populous countries in the world will include three African countries. Nigeria with over half a billion inhabitants will take third place after the Asian giants at the expense of the United States, but the Democratic Republic of Congo with over 400 million inhabitants and Ethiopia with over 300 will also enter the ranking.

Such a change in the ranking in fact means an ever smaller relative weight in terms of population for the Western world and for Europe in particular. If we look at the trend by continents, in 1950 the African population represented just over 9% of the world's population; today it represents twice as much and in 2050 it will reach a quarter of the world's population (and will continue its run even beyond). Asia, now at almost 60%, will account for a little more than half of the world's population in 2050, similar to where it stood in 1950. The Americas will fall slightly, from 13 to 12 percent. Europe, on the other hand, which had 22% of world population 1950, today is at 9.3% and in 2050 it will be at 7.4% (if anything, it has increased slightly only due to international migration and certainly not to national birthrate). The current European Union, equal to 5.6% of the world's population, will lose one point between now and 2050.

Certainly, in today's world, "numbers are no longer power", as was considered in the preparation of national armies centuries ago, but neither can we think that demographic change at such different speeds will have no geopolitical impact. Countries that are still demographically vibrant have an abundance of young people to educate and include in the labor market, while rich countries in demographic decline fear the generous welfare threatened by the strong growth of the elderly and the marked decrease in the number of young people. What will be the relationship between the different areas of the planet, engaged in such different challenges? Will changing geodemographics weigh on international political arrangements? A few pairs of opposing numbers referring to 1950 and 2050 can make us reflect on future international balances in a couple of decades: China was 45% larger than India in 1950 and will be 15% smaller a century later; the northern shore of the Mediterranean (i.e. Southern Europe) had twice the population of North Africa and will be two-thirds smaller a century later; the United States was five times more populous than neighboring Mexico and will be only a little more than twice as populous; the United States had one and a half times the population of Russia and will be three times as numerous; Japan was a quarter of India in 1950 and will be only one seventeenth in 2050. And we could go on.