The Long Shadow of War

Europe and the Russia-Ukraine war Mario Draghi said: "Ukraine has to win the war, otherwise there will be very negative consequences for the European Union." It is obvious that any country that puts high weight on the objectives of international stability and democracy must hope that the outcome of an aggression ends with the defeat of the aggressor. But Draghi's words seem to emphasize that the EU would have something more to lose in the opposite scenario. Why? The risk for the EU hinted by Draghi has to do with political stability, internal cohesion, credibility, and the likelihood of further political integration. The Russia-Ukraine war is in part a proxy war, where the consolidation of the EU, democracy and NATO are as much at stake as the defense of a country and international law. Moreover, there are EU countries like Hungary and Bulgaria, just to give some examples, whose public opinions are split in half on the war, only in part due to the dependence on Russia for oil and gas. Russian propaganda that the war is ultimately caused by NATO expansionism and the consequent existential threat for Russia is believed by a large fraction of people also in other countries. In case of an outcome perceived as a Ukrainian defeat or surrender, all the EU governments who sustained Ukraine in various forms would be accused by their electorates of wasting resources, and some governments could fall. The blame could be particularly high for international elites, and populist and nationalist forces inside many countries could receive a crucial boost. For this reason, the EU support for Ukraine will remain high at least until the next European elections.
The outcome of a war is very rarely full victory for one or the other, and hence a connected concern is which kind of peace agreement Europe should be advocating for in the diplomacy game. Any peace agreement must give both governments a way to sell it internally as a success. A partial success of the Ukraine counteroffensive on one hand and an international recognition of a border slightly different than that of 2014 could be a possibility regardless of EU policies.

However, given that Ukraine aims to join EU and NATO, the EU has to decide what best to ask in return, in order to reduce the risk of future further conflicts. As Nobel prize winner Roger Myerson already advocated in 2013, greater autonomy for the Donbas republics (to be redefined) and Crimea, greater openness to multilingual education in schools and local reconciliation policies will be crucial. While in 2013 a federalism reform with greater autonomy and multiculturalism would have been necessary and perhaps sufficient to avoid civil war in 2014, now it may be necessary to support independence of a subset of the contested territory, with a peacekeeping role given to Turkey for example. Most important, in the aftermath of the war the EU will have to decide whether it sides fully with the United States in the direction of a bipolar and divided geopolitical order or whether it needs to push for a return to global cooperation and free trade. Both for its political weight in diplomacy for peace and its geopolitical role in big choices after the war, the EU should increase the pace of political integration, in the direction of common defense and stronger governance. Hence Draghi's concern is well taken, because the many global challenges we face require a European Union with a stronger position and a united voice, and a defeat of Ukraine would make such things much less likely.