Russia's "military special operation" seriously questions the identity of the European Union. So far, the reaction has been commendable; realism however is asking for something else.
The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of a hegemon, the US, in a world order characterized by a consensus around liberal values, shared by two powerful allies, the EU and Japan. Then, globalization itself turned the "unipolar moment" on its head. In 1999, after two decades of reforms, the Chinese GDP per capita was nearly $900 dollars (at 2021 constant prices), while in 2013 was well over $7,000. Globalization made Russia an indispensable energy provider (particularly for Europe). Granting huge political consensus to its leadership, Russian per capita GDP rose from $1330 dollars to nearly $16,000 in the same time span.
Convergence had three relevant effects. First, revisionist powers, unhappy with the Western-centered world order, became stronger and more assertive. Secondly, because of this a new kind of ideological clash emerged: in the words of Mr. Putin, "liberalism has outlived its purposes". Thirdly, geopolitics is back. Both Russia and China share an "imperial size", comparable to that of the US. China controls strategic technologies, while Russia enjoys a vast endowment of strategic natural resources. While remaining inferior with respect to the US in terms of military spending, both countries are nuclear powers. Size apart, they ostensibly exhibit a contemporary version of "imperial behavior", both in cultural terms and through their revanchist nationalistic stances, including aggressive behavior at their external borders.
What is Europe's role in the new "Great Game"? This depends a lot from the EU itself. Understandably, Europeans have several issues with the concept of empire itself – after all, in 1957 all the founding members of the Union still were motherlands of empires (France in Western Africa, Belgium/Luxembourg in Congo), held colonial possessions (the Netherlands in Western New Guinea) or had just lost their imperial territories (Italy and (West) Germany) as a consequence of their defeat in World War II. After a painful decolonization process, no surprise that empire and imperial pretensions were erased from the vocabulary of Europeans.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dymtro Kuleba, interviewed by the New York Times in June 2022, put a new spin on the concept of "empire". According to him, the EU may be seen as "the first ever attempt to build a liberal empire", that is a supranational institution based on liberal and democratic principles endowed with powers superior to those of its single units. "I understand that people do not like the word empire, but this is how history is written...You have to show that different things of a similar scale [emphasis added] can be built on different principles: those of liberalism, democracy, respect for human rights, and not on the principle of imposition of the will of one on the rest."
To survive as a liberal construct in a world of empires, the EU must recognize that "size" matters. Size includes relevant attributes of power, such as population (which means, of course, human capital quality), control over strategic technologies and resources, offensive and defensive capabilities and, last but not least, cultural influence and soft power. None of the single member states has enough of these elements. But size is nothing without a clear identity; and identity calls for historical consciousness.
First of all, Europeans must start considering "empires" not as political relics of the past. As all things in the continuous flow of history, they can come back under certain conditions. Imperial history must therefore be studied, as a useful comparator for the present.
Second, Europeans must understand that the present geopolitical revolution calls for a deep rethinking not simply of the governance of the Union. An economic community is a very good solution in periods of international liberalism, cooperation, and expanding global integration. The present is different. Europeans must recognize the necessity of a political entity powerful enough to defend what is even more important than economic growth, which is liberal democracy.
Finally, EU must come to terms with its imperial legacy. The opportunity lies in this paradox: post-imperial colonial powers can now forge a solid political entity of the size of an "empire" which is no longer based on asymmetric exploitation of the periphery by the metropole, but on a liberal, respectful and mutually advantageous relationship among its multiple identities.
