2023 OUTLOOK

The political landscape of the European Union is in constant flux, as populist and sovereignist parties have grown considerably in many countries, both as a governing and as opposition forces. The question that arises immediately is what is the potential impact of these movements on the dynamics of European integration.

From this point of view, it is important to note how the most recent crises have changed both the rhetoric used by some of these forces and the dynamics within the European Union. Until Brexit, crises had been managed by the EU in a disunited way: just think of the imposition of austerity on the most vulnerable countries during the financial crisis; or to disagreements in dealing with the migration crisis of 2015. Brexit, a real existential crisis of the Union, however marked a watershed: while the United Kingdom sought the "divide and conquer", the Union succeeded to be united and conduct negotiations a granite-strong block, which even under stress did not show any cracks. The pandemic crisis then created an ideological short circuit in the sovereign movements of the most affected countries: Europe, previously so vilified, now was expected to come to the help. The solution found, the European Recovery Fund, is antithetical to any sovereign impulse, since the economic support this time is also given in the form of non-repayable funds, which in other words are loans that do not have to be repaid by the beneficiary state. Put simply, this means mutualization of debt, so that funds given to Italy potentially affect the budgets of other countries. And such mutualization is incompatible with the notion of Europe as simply an association of states. And while the reaction to the crisis resulting from the invasion of Ukraine is much more varied, demonstrating that there is in reality no unity of purpose in EU foreign policy, one perceives, at least on the part of the more economically exposed states, the search for a European solution to the energy crisis.

The temptation is therefore to think that sovereignist movements are making a virtue of necessity and transforming themselves into "light" sovereignists: more a change in rhetoric than anything else. But this is only partially true: in the first place because the acceptance of debt mutualization and the acceleration of European integration deriving from it are not so welcome by national populist movements in the so-called frugal states: if the recent crises may have partially defused sovereignist impulses in some states, they have acted as a detonator in others. We must then also reflect on the way in which these changes are being made at the EU level: the role of the European Council and of intergovernmental mediation has gained the upper hand in the management of these crises. On the one hand, this is both natural and necessary: ​​the recovery fund constitutes an enormous step forward in the process of European integration and it is therefore understandable that it was the European Council that took a leading role. And it should also be remembered that from a legal point of view it was decided to base the recovery on three distinct tools that allow for the involvement of all levels of governance, including national parliaments, so as to stem the accusations of excess competence (see the case pending before the German Constitutional Court) and lack of democratic accountability.

And yet, this dominance of the European Council, and of the Commission, now a political body in technocratic guise, constitutes a step backwards in the process of "supranational" integration - it is the national governments that are at the helm, reducing both the influence and the power of the European Parliament, since the latter institution is effectively excluded from the management of the recovery fund. As far as Italy is concerned, it is yet to be seen how the foreign policy of the new government will develop, and what the strength of sovereignist instincts will be within it. On the one hand, in fact, one would expect a rather conflictual relationship with Europe. On the other hand, President Meloni's international ambitions, and the need for European support, mean that this conflict will be subdued except perhaps on immigration. where there will be an even greater assertion of national sovereignty. It is difficult to predict how sovereignism will play out in times of crisis, but surely there will be a drive to ensure that international decisions, especially in Europe, go back in the hands of national governments, to the detriment of a more integrated and federalist vision of the European Union.